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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
deemed to make the most significant contribution to New York's pro-
cedural law. Due to limitations of space, however, many other less
important, but, nevertheless, significant cases cannot be included.
While few cases are exhaustively discussed, it is hoped that the Survey
accomplishes its basic purpose, viz., to key the practitioner to signifi-
cant developments in the procedural law of New York.
The Table of Contents is designed to direct the reader to those
specific areas of procedural law which may be of importance to him.
The various sections of the CPLR which are specifically treated in
the cases are listed under their respective titles.
ARTICLE 2- LIMITATIONS OF TIME
CPLR 203: "Continuing treatment" rule applied to injury sustained
during hospitalization.
In O'Laughlin v. Salamanca Hospital District Authority,' plaintiff
patient brought an action for injuries sustained allegedly due to the
negligence of defendant hospital. Plaintiff had fallen from a hospital
bed on March 15, 1968, and continued to be treated for the injuries
which she sustained in the fall until her discharge on June 20, 1968.
Plaintiff commenced this action by service of a summons and complaint
upon defendant on June 5, 1969. The Supreme Court, Special Term,
dismissed the action as not being timely commenced, and plaintiff ap-
pealed.2
Under Public Authorities Law § 1777(l) and (2) and CPLR 204(a),
plaintiff had one year and sixty days from the accrual of her cause of
action within which to institute suit. Whether plaintiff had done so
depended upon whether the action accrued at the time of her fall or
upon her discharge. In Borgia v. City of New York 3 the Court of
Appeals held that such a cause of action accrues at the conclusion of
continuous treatment, even though the original treatment that the
patient was receiving is not of the same nature as that subsequent to
the injury.4 The Appellate Division, Fourth Department, concluded
136 App. Div. 2d 51, 319 N.Y.S.2d 128 (4th Dep't 1971).
2 Id. at 52, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 129.
8 12 N.Y.2d 151, 187 N.E.2d 777, 237 N.YS.2d 319 (1962). For discussion of this case
see Lillich, The Malpractice Statute of Limitations in New York and Other Jurisdictions,
47 CONE.L L.Q. 339, 344-47 (1962); McLaughlin, Civil Practice, 15 SYRAcusE L. P.Zv. 381,
389 (1963); 27 ALBANY L. Rxv. 312 (1963); 31 FoRDHAm L. Rlv. 8,42, 844 (1963); 37 Sr.
JOHN'S L. RwV. 385, 390 (1963).
4 The court expressly held "that at least when the course of treatment which includes
[treatment for injuries sustained through] the wrongful acts or omissions has run con-
tinuous and is related to the same original condition or complaint, the 'accrual' comes only
at the end of the treatment." 12 N.Y.2d at 155, 187 NXE.2d at 778, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 321.
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that the Borgia case was controlling here and reversed the lower court.5
Application of the "continuing treatment" rule to subsequent
injuries sustained at the hospital is welcome. For, the same policy
considerations supporting the rule where treatment is for the original
injury also apply to any other injuries sustained during hospitalization.
CPLR 214(6): Flanagan rule strictly limited by Second Department.
Under CPLR 214(6), an action to recover damages for malpractice
must be commenced within three years. The historic rule in this state
concerning medical malpractice is that this statute of limitations runs
from the time when the alleged malpractice occurs.6 This general rule
was modified in Flanagan v. Mount Eden General Hospital,7 wherein
the Court of Appeals held that the above statute commences to run upon
discovery by plaintiff in cases in which the defendant negligently fails
to remove a foreign object from plaintiff patient's body.8 Is Flanagan
a first step toward complete rejection of the general rule or merely an
exception necessitated by special equities inherent in foreign body
cases only?
In Schiffman v. Hospital for Joint Diseases9 the Supreme Court,
Kings County, and the Appellate Division, Second Department, de-
dined to further modify this rule. In his complaint, plaintiff alleged
that he discovered in 1967 that his tissue specimen taken in 1959 had
been falsely diagnosed as malignant. In 1969, plaintiff brought an action
charging defendants with negligence and seeking damages for the
administration of unnecessary radiation therapy. There was no allega-
tion that defendants knowingly concealed the slides of the aforemen-
tioned tissue from plaintiff. Whether the action was timely commenced
depended upon whether said statute began to run at the time of the
alleged negligence or upon discovery. The supreme court and the
Second Department, refusing to equate misreading of slides with failure
to remove foreign objects, dismissed the action as barred by the statute
of limitations.' 0
However, in light of the factual situation in Borgia, it is clear that the court dispensed
with the former requirement that the continuing treatment be similar in nature to that
which gave rise to the cause of action, 36 App. Div. 2d at 52-53, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 10,
citing 12 N.Y.2d at 160, 187 N.E.2d at 781, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 325 (Froessel, J. dissenting.)
5 36 App. Div. 2d at 53, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 131.
6 See Conklin v. Draper, 254 N.Y. 620, 173 N.E. 892 (1930), afg 229 App. Div. 227, 241
N.YS. 529 (Ist Dept).
7 24 N.Y.2d 427, 248 N.E.2d 871, 301 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1969); see 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR
214, supp. commentary at 77-78 (1969).
8 Id. at 431, 248 N.E.2d at 873, 301 N.YS.2d at 26.
9 36 App. Div. 2d 31, 319 N.Y.S.2d 674 (2d Dep't 1971).
10 Id. at 31-32, 819 N.Y.S.2d at 675-76.
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